Daniel Hausman

Biography

Daniel Hausman is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and was previously at the London School of Economics, Carnegie Mellon University, Lawrence University, and Columbia University. He has written extensively on the philosophy of economics.

He was a co-founding editor of the journal Economics and Philosophy.

Major Ideas

Critique of Libertarian Paternalism

Following the challenge to neoclassical economics by behavioral economists, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have developed a new political philosophy (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). Specifically, they develop a new normative account for how the state should interact with its citizenry, which they call libertarian paternalism. They claim that, in certain domains, a state enacting libertarian paternalist policies can “nudge” its citizens to make better decisions without restricting the autonomy of its citizenry to make free and independent choices.

Daniel Hausman (along with Brynn Welch) has presented a critique of this political philosophy.

In A Democratic Society, Government Policy Should Be Overt

Hausman & Welch (2010, pg. 134) have suggested that government nudging in situations where nudging is avoidable may be “inconsistent with the respect toward citizens that a representative government ought to show. If a government is supposed to treat its citizens as agents who, within the limits that derive from the rights and interests of others, determine the direction of their own lives, then it should be reluctant to use means to influence them other than rational persuasion.” 

Hausman & Welch (2010, pg. 135) have also suggested that it may be easier for citizens in a democratic society to monitor openly coercive policies (i.e. regulations) than covert nudges.  

Libertarian Paternalism is Just a Form of Paternalism

Hausman & Welch (2010, pg. 128) have suggested that Thaler & Sunstein have not found a way to reconcile state paternalism with respect for individual liberty, as libertarian paternalism claims to do. They argue that individual liberty is not merely about not closing off choices (i.e. leaving the choice set unchanged) but also about autonomy and control over the decisions an individual makes. They write, “[i]f one is concerned with autonomy as well as freedom, narrowly conceived, then there does seem to be something paternalistic, not merely beneficent, in designing policies so as to take advantage of people’s psychological foibles for their own benefit. …. The reason why nudges such as setting defaults seem …. to be paternalist, is that in addition to or apart from rational persuasion, they may “push” individuals to make one choice rather than another. Their freedom, in the sense of what alternatives can be chosen, is virtually unaffected, but when this “pushing” does not take the form of rational persuasion, their autonomy—the extent to which they have control over their own evaluations and deliberation—is diminished. Their actions reflect the tactics of the choice architect rather than exclusively their own evaluation of alternatives.”

Nudges May Be Subject to Abuse

Hausman & Welch (2010, pgs. 131 & 135) have suggested that nudges may be subject to abuse by malevolent actors.

(Learn more about libertarian paternalism and Hausman’s critique of it here.)